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I. Introduction 
The American patent system, codified by the United States Congress,
1
 consists of a 
complex statutory framework that governs the patent monopoly.  The patent grant is often 
considered more powerful than other monopolistic intellectual property grants such as copyrights 
or trademarks;
2
 the patent grant allows the holder to exclude all others from practicing his patent 
for the entire term of the patent.
3
  The United States Patent and Trademark Office (the 
“USPTO”), however, will only grant a patent if certain statutory requirements are met.4  Before 
receiving a patent, inventors are required to demonstrate that their invention is “useful.”5  The 
requisite level of utility that an inventor must demonstrate to the USPTO has varied throughout 
American history.  In the early 19
th
 century, Justice Joseph Story defined a utility test that 
became ubiquitous in American patent law.
6
  The test, simply stated, deemed all inventions that 
                                                 
*
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1
 Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2006). 
2
 Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual 
Property, 5 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 3, 6-7 (1991). 
3
 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (“Every patent shall contain…a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, 
of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States…”); Besen & Raskind, supra note 2, at 7.  
4
 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-123; Besen & Raskind, supra note 2, at 7. 
5
 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain 
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”) (emphasis added). 
6
 Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817); W. PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR 
INVENTIONS; INCLUDING THE REMEDIES IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN RELATION TO PATENT RIGHTS 
141 (American Stationers’ Co. 1837) (explaining Justice Story’s standard is “now universally 
adopted in the United States”). 
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were not injurious to society or against public policy to be “useful.”7  This minimalist standard of 
utility applied to all patent applications until the middle of the 20
th
 century.   
As the world grew in complexity, the United States Supreme Court held that a more 
stringent utility standard was necessary for patentable chemical inventions.
8
  The Court 
determined that for a chemical process or compound to meet the requisite level of utility 
necessary for the patent grant, the inventor must demonstrate substantial, specific utility in the 
chemical invention’s present form.9  Today, all chemical inventions seeking the patent grant 
must still pass this overly rigorous utility test.
10
  
This paper argues that, in the ever-evolving arena of chemistry, Justice Story’s utility 
standard is economically preferable to the strict and burdensome utility standard set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson.
11
  By applying different economic theories 
to intellectual property rights, economists, lawyers, and legislators can accurately approximate 
the optimal balance between providing incentives to creators while persevering the public’s right 
of access to their creations.
12
  Section II of this article details the origin of the American patent 
system and its utility requirement.  Section III explores the fluctuating utility requirement from 
its inception to its modern standard.  Finally, Section IV of this paper applies the net benefit rule 
and the average cost theory to both Justice Story’s utility standard and the Brenner utility 
                                                 
7
 Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37. 
8
 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35, 16 L. Ed. 2d 69, 80, 86 S. Ct. 1033, 1042 (1966). 
9
 Id. 
10
 Dev A. Ghose, A Proposal to Modify the Utility Standard for Patenting Biotechnology 
Research Tools, 56 EMORY L.J. 1661, 1675-80 (2007). 
11
 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535. 
12
 David W. Barnes, The Incentives/Access Tradeoff, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 96 (2010) 
(citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“Creative work is to 
be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of 
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”)); Besen & Raskind, 
supra note 2, at 6-7. 
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standard in the field of chemistry and concludes that a more relaxed utility standard is beneficial 
for both inventors and the American public. 
II. Patents Generally 
A patent is an exclusive right granted to an inventor from his government that allows the 
inventor to protect his invention.
13
  The patent right is granted in different ways by governments 
around the world based on each government’s legal system.14  The general process of acquiring a 
patent requires an individual to file an application for the patent with his government; after an 
inspection, the government will grant the exclusive right for a specific term of years if the 
application meets all the statutory criteria for patent protection.
15
  During this term, the patent 
owner is not required to use or practice the patent; rather, the owner is granted the authority to 
prevent others from practicing the patent without consent.
16
 
There are two main justifications for patent protection: (1) to encourage innovation and 
(2) to require public disclosure.
17
  First, a patent system is necessary to avoid the “inventor’s 
paradox;” this occurs when an inventor cannot reap monetary rewards for his invention because 
he fears that the invention will be stolen and duplicated if he publicly sells it.
18
  Without patent 
                                                 
13
 Katie Lula, How to See a Jar of Peanut Butter: Evaluating Empirical Studies of Patents and 
Patent Law, 7 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS. & TRADE L. 151, 154 (2007) (“a right or title that is 
conferred by ‘a government authority to an individual or organization [...]. The sole right to 
make, use, or sell some invention [...].’”) (quoting THE CANADIAN OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 1138 (Oxford University Press 2004)). 
14
 Lula, supra note 13, at 154. 
15
 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (“…such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the 
patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed 
in the United States…”); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 3 
(Princeton University Press 2004). 
16
 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 15, at 3. 
17
 GRAEME B. DINWOODIE  ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW 49 
(LexisNexis Publishing 2002). 
18
 DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 66 (Foundation Press 2d ed. 2001) 
(“Any potential buyer, of course, will not pay a high price, or perhaps any price at all, unless 
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protection, inventors would be far less likely to share their inventions and ideas, which would 
stifle creation.
19
  With patent protection, however, the “inventor’s paradox” is eliminated, and 
inventors can earn income through “patent licensing, joint ventures, and strategic alliances.”20 
Secondly, a patent system provides public disclosure of all new inventions.
21
  The 
government that grants the patent offers certain statutory protection as a quid pro quo for the 
inventor’s coherent disclosure of the invention.22  According to author Robert M. Sherwood, 
“[t]he history of intellectual property is essentially the emergence of recognition that a 
community benefits when it encourages its creative and inventive people by honoring the 
products of their minds.” 23   Thus, all patent systems theoretically encourage creation, 
commercial activity, and public disclosure at a national level. 
III. The American Patent Utility Standard 
A. The Origin of United States Patent Law 
The origin of United States patent law can be traced to the United States Constitution. 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, commonly referred to as the Patent and Copyright Clause, 
empowers Congress to “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
                                                                                                                                                             
sufficient details are disclosed. The inventor, however, does not want to disclose too much, for 
fear the would-be buyer will instead become an independent producer of the invention's 
commercial embodiment, and a competitor of the true inventor. The inventor's paradox may be 
solved by a patent, which gives the inventor the freedom to disclose without fear of self-induced 
competition.”). 
19
 Lula, supra note 13, at 157. 
20
 KAMIL IDRIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A POWER TOOL FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 9 (2d ed. 
2003).  
21
 35 U.S.C. §§ 112-113; Lula, supra note 13, at 159. 
22
 Id. at 159. 
23
 Robert M. Sherwood, Human Creativity for Economic Development: Patents Propel 
Technology 33 AKRON L. REV. 351, 352 (2000). 
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Discoveries.”24  In 1790, Congress initially codified the American patent system,25 which was 
soon amended and followed by the Patent Act of 1793.
26
  Over the course of the past 200 years, 
Congress has modified the patent statutes several times.
27
  Today, the Patent Act of 1952 is the 
current statute governing patents in the United States.
28
  To receive a patent from the USPTO, an 
inventor must demonstrate four requirements: (1) statutory subject matter, (2) utility, (3) novelty, 
and (4) nonobviousness.
29
  Additionally, the inventor must provide a written disclosure sufficient 
to instruct others how to recreate his invention.
30
   
This paper specifically examines the required level of utility an inventor must 
demonstrate to receive the patent grant.  Because the statutory language only vaguely states that 
“useful” inventions will receive the patent grant, the definition of “useful” has largely been left 
to the judicial branch for interpretation.
31
   
B. The Story Standard 
In Bedford v. Hunt, Justice Story examined what level of utility was required to be 
demonstrated to receive the patent grant.
32
 After the plaintiff brought suit for patent 
infringement, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s patent should not have been granted 
because his invention lacked usefulness.
33
   
                                                 
24
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
25
 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (1790). 
26
 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323 (1793); see also N. Scott Pierce, In re Dane K. 
Fisher: An Exercise in Utility, 6 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 2 (2006). 
27
 Ghose, supra note 10, at 1665. 
28
 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et 
seq. (2006)). 
29
 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103; Ghose, supra note 10, at 1664. 
30
 35 U.S.C. § 112; Ghose, supra note 10, at 1664. 
31
 35 U.S.C. § 101; Ghose, supra note 10, at 1664. 
32
 Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37. 
33
 Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37. 
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In deciding the case, the court first summarized the language of the Patent Act of 1793 
stating “[n]o person is entitled to a patent under the act of congress unless he has invented some 
new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or used 
before.”34  Interpreting the statute, Justice Story found that Congress intended to establish a very 
minimal utility requirement.
35
  The court held that the inventor need not establish that his 
invention supersedes all others in a particular field; rather, it explained that Congress envisioned 
giving the patent grant to inventions that were not “injurious to the morals, the health, or the 
good order of society.”36   He proposed that an invention should be patentable if it has no 
obnoxious tendencies and if it may be applied to a practical use.
37
  Thus, in coming to its 
conclusion, the court did not focus on the invention’s degree of utility, but rather focused on the 
invention not being contrary to public policy.
38
 
C. The Spread of the Story Standard 
Justice Story’s utility analysis spread from the Massachusetts Circuit to the Pennsylvania 
Circuit in Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank.
39
  There, the invention in question was a modification to 
the common rolling press that allowed the press to print either double-sided copper-plates or 
single-sided copper-plates on one side and single-sided letter press on the other.
40
  The machine 
was designed to help prevent counterfeit notes.
41
  
                                                 
34
 Id. (emphasis added). 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. 
37
 Id. (“If its practical utility be very limited, it will follow, that it will be of little or no profit to 
the inventor; and if it be trifling, it will sink into utter neglect. The law, however, does not look 
to the degree of utility; it simply requires, that it shall be capable of use, and that the use is such 
as sound morals and policy do not discountenance or prohibit.”). 
38
 Id.; Pierce, supra note 26, at 5. 
39
 Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank, 14 F. Cas. 746 (C.C.D. Pa. 1820). 
40
 Kneass, 14 F. Cas. at 747. 
41
 Id. (“…as an additional security against counterfeiture.”). 
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The defendant claimed the invention was not patentable because it lacked utility.
42
  The 
court dismissed the defendant’s defense by posing this question: if the invention lacked utility, 
why did the defendant copy and manufacture the patented invention?
43
  The court then recited 
Justice Story’s statutory interpretation whereby if an invention is not injurious or against public 
policy and is not worthless, then the invention meets the necessary utility threshold.
44
  Therefore, 
the modified rolling press was found to satisfy the utility requirement.
45
  
In 1837, Willard Phillips stated in his treatise that Justice Story’s utility analysis was 
“now universally adopted in the United States.”46  During this same time period, the patent law 
utility requirement and novelty requirement clearly diverged into two separate analyses.
47
  
Scholars began to draw a sharp distinction between relative utility and positive utility.
48
  In 1849, 
G.T. Curtis published a patent treatise interpreting the Patent Act of 1836
49
 explaining Congress’ 
intention to bifurcate the Constitutional requirements of “new” and “useful.”50  Curtis explained 
                                                 
42
 Id. at 748. 
43
 Id. (“If the plaintiff's invention correspond substantially with the thing used by the defendants, 
how can the latter be permitted to say, that the thing so discovered and used is worthless?”). 
44
 Id. (“In the case of Lowell v. Lewis…Justice Story, commenting upon this subject, lays it 
down, that the law only requires that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well 
being, good policy, and sound morals of society. ‘The word ‘useful,’ therefore, he adds, ‘is 
incorporated into the act, in contradiction to mischievous, or immoral.’”) (quoting Lowell v. 
Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817)). 
45
 Kneass, 14 F. Cas. at 747. 
46
 PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 141.  
47
 Pierce, supra note 26, at 7-8 (citing G. T. CURTIS, TREATISE OF THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR 
USEFUL INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (Charles C. Little and James Brown 
1849)) (“The Patent Act now in force in this country requires that the subject of every patent 
should be "new and useful," whether it be an art, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or an improvement on any of these things. The inquiry that meets us on the threshold is, 
what constitutes novelty, and what constitutes utility, in the sense of the statute?”) [hereinafter, 
CURTIS I]. 
48
 CURTIS I, supra note 47, at 3. 
49
 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 
50
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; CURTIS I, supra note 47, at 3 (citing Justice Story’s opinion in 
Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254, 256 (D. Mass. 1825)) (“It gives the first inventor, or discoverer of 
  8 
that the terms were to be viewed separately in their conjunctive form and that the analysis of 
each be independent.
51
  To receive a patent, an invention was required to be “new;”52  this 
analysis tested the invention’s relative utility.53  The invention must be substantially different 
than any invention in the prior art.
54
  This relative utility should not be confused with the 
minimalist positive utility standard set forth by Justice Story, which describes the “useful” aspect 
of an invention.
55
  Thus, throughout the 19
th
 century, the statutory utility requirement was 
distinct in its own analysis and quite minimalistic. 
D. Departure from the Story Standard in the Field of Chemistry 
In the field of chemistry, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the 
“CCPA”) began to take a stricter stance on the utility requirement in in re Bremner.56 The 
invention in question was a process for a production of polymers.
57
  The patent application, 
however, only explicitly described the steps in the process and failed to demonstrate any use, 
which is why the Board of Appeals within the Patent Office (the “Board”) denied the patent 
                                                                                                                                                             
the thing, the exclusive right, and asks nothing as to the mode or extent of the application of his 
genius to conceive or execute it. It must also be useful, that is, it must not be noxious or 
mischievous, but capable of being applied to good purposes; and perhaps it may also be a just 
interpretation of the law, that it meant to exclude things absolutely frivolous and foolish. But the 
degree of positive utility is less important in the eye of the law, than some other things, though in 
regard to the inventor, as a measure of the value of the invention, it is of the highest 
importance.”). 
51
 CURTIS I, supra note 47, at 3. 
52
 5 Stat. at 117. 
53
 G. T. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS, 110 (Little, 
Brown and Co. 4th ed. 1873) (“Care must be taken, however, to discriminate between what may 
be called the positive utility of an invention, which is made by the statute a mere description of 
the class of inventions which can be the subjects of valid patents, and that comparative or 
relative utility which is sometimes applied as one of the tests of novelty, or substantial difference 
of structure or mode of operation.”) [hereinafter, CURTIS II]. 
54
 Pierce, supra note 26, at 13 (citing Curtis II, supra note 53, at 110). 
55
 Pierce, supra note 26, at 14. 
56
 In re Bremner, 182 F.2d 216 (1950). 
57
 Id. 
  9 
grant.
58
  The CCPA upheld the Board’s decision holding that all patent applications are required 
to demonstrate a use.
59
  The court concluded “[t]here is nothing in the application which asserts 
utility nor any thing indicating what [the] use of the product may be made.”60  This decision 
began a trend to deviate from, at least in the field of chemistry, the minimalist standard set forth 
by Justice Story.
61
   
As a result of the lack of a uniform utility test for chemical inventions throughout the 
courts, the United States Supreme Court examined patent law’s utility requirement in Brenner v. 
Manson.
62
  Respondent Andrew Manson was a chemist who filed a patent application for a 
process that made particular steroids.
63
  The application was rejected by a USPTO examiner, and 
the rejection was affirmed by the Board.
64
  Both the examiner and the Board cited that the 
application omitted any cognizable use.
65
  Manson, in an effort to cure his application, directed 
the Board to an article in a well-renowned chemistry periodical that revealed the steroid in 
question was related to other research, which had demonstrated some scientific promise of 
reducing the effects of tumors in mice.
66
  The Board firmly held, however, “our view that the 
statutory requirement of usefulness of a product cannot be presumed merely because it happens 
to be closely related to another compound which is known to be useful.”67 
                                                 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. (“It is our view that no ‘hard and fast’ ruling properly may be made fixing the extent of the 
disclosure of utility necessary in an application, but we feel certain that the law requires that 
there be in the application an assertion of utility and an indication of the use or uses intended.”). 
60
 Id. 
61
 Pierce, supra note 26, at 21. 
62
 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 519; Pierce, supra note 26, at 21-31. 
63
 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 520-21. 
64
 Id. at 521. 
65
 Id. (“The ground for rejection was the failure ‘to disclose any utility for’ the chemical 
compound produced by the process.”). 
66
 Id. at 522. 
67
 Id. 
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On appeal, the CCPA reversed the Board’s decision holding that Manson was entitled to 
the patent.
68
  The CCPA attempted to restore Justice Story’s utility standard holding “where a 
claimed process produces a known product it is not necessary to show utility for the product,” so 
long as the product “is not alleged to be detrimental to the public interest.”69  The government 
appealed, and certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court to resolve the conflict 
of what constitutes utility in a chemical process.
70
 
At the Supreme Court, Manson advanced several different arguments in his attempt to 
establish the requisite level of utility.
71
  First, he claimed that his compound has a specific utility 
in that it produces an adjacent homologue that inhibits the effects of tumors in mice.
72
  The 
Court, dissatisfied with Manson’s evidence that the process would routinely yield a tumor 
inhibiting homologue, rejected this argument.
73
  
Next, Manson claimed that the chemical process was useful simply because (1) it 
produces the intended compound, or alternatively (2) produces a compound belonging to a class 
of steroids that are under intensive scientific exploration.
74
  The Court, exploring several 
arguments by both the respondent and the petitioner, articulated a critical component of the 
patent quid pro quo that weighed in favor of Manson: the public benefit of disclosure.
75
  The 
                                                 
68
 In re Manson, 333 F.2d 234, 238 (1964). 
69
 Id. at 237. 
70
 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 523. 
71
 Id. at 530-34. 
72
 Id. at 532. 
73
 Id. (“Indeed, respondent himself recognized that the presumption that adjacent homologues 
have the same utility has been challenged in the steroid field because of ‘a greater known 
unpredictability of compounds in that field.’  In these circumstances and in this technical area, 
we would not overturn the finding of the Primary Examiner, affirmed by the Board of Appeals 
and not challenged by the CCPA.”). 
74
 Id. at 532. 
75
 Id. at 533 (“It is true, of course, that one of the purposes of the patent system is to encourage 
dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions.”). 
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Court, however, evaluated that benefit against the dangers of the grant of a monopoly along with 
the potential for scientists to abuse and block off certain areas of research with a patent.
76
  The 
Court reasoned that Congress intended to require inventors to demonstrate “substantial” utility 
before the government granted the patent monopoly.
77
   
Additionally, the Court stated that a compound’s potential for further study was an 
insufficient demonstration of utility.
78
  Here, the Court analogized the granting of a patent at 
such an early stage to a license to hunt; the Court stated, though, that the patent grant should be 
given as a reward for a successful conclusion to the hunt, rather than just the opportunity to 
hunt.
79
 
Ultimately, the Court rejected Justice Story’s standard noting that it shed little light on 
the subject of chemical processes.
80
  The Court reasoned “many things in this world which may 
not be considered ‘useful’ but which, nevertheless, are totally without a capacity for harm.”81 
Thus, the Court rejected the inverse correlation between harm and usefulness that was at the key 
of Justice Story’s utility standard.82 
Finally, the Court held that for a chemical process to meet the requisite utility standard 
deserving of the quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and Congress for the patent 
                                                 
76
 Id. at 534. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. at 535-36.  
79
 Id. (“This is not to say that we mean to disparage the importance of contributions to the fund 
of scientific information short of the invention of something ‘useful,’ or that we are blind to the 
prospect that what now seems without ‘use’ may tomorrow command the grateful attention of 
the public. But a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but 
compensation for its successful conclusion.”). 
80
 Id. at 534. 
81
 Id. 
82
 See id. 
  12 
grant, the process must demonstrate three specific criteria.
83
   The inventor must establish (1) 
“substantial” utility refined to a point where (2) “specific” benefit (3) “exists in [a] currently 
available form.”84  Applying this new standard to the facts of Brenner, the Court found that 
Manson had not sufficiently demonstrated utility and rejected his application for the patent.
85
 
Many critics disagreed with the 7-2 majority in Brenner, including Justice Harlan who 
authored the dissent.
86
  Justice Harlan’s argument, formed from a public policy perspective, 
claimed that an invention could achieve the minimum threshold of utility “simply because it 
facilitates further research into possible product uses.”87  Justice Harlan explained that the field 
of chemistry has brought humanity many tangible benefits, but those benefits are often a result of 
building discoveries from their predecessors.
88
  Justice Harlan believed that if chemists are 
refused patents due to a lack of “substantial” utility, then the scientific community would share 
significantly less information with the public, which would stunt the growth of knowledge in the 
scientific community.
89
 
                                                 
83
 Id. at 535. 
84
 Id.  
85
 Id.  
86
 Id. at 536 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
87
 Id. at 537 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
88
 Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
89
 Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“What I find most troubling about the result reached by the 
Court is the impact it may have on chemical research. Chemistry is a highly interrelated field and 
a tangible benefit for society may be the outcome of a number of different discoveries, one 
discovery building upon the next. To encourage one chemist or research facility to invent and 
disseminate new processes and products may be vital to progress, although the product or 
process be without "utility" as the Court defines the term, because that discovery permits 
someone else to take a further but perhaps less difficult step leading to a commercially useful 
item.”). 
  13 
Several other critics of the Brenner decision observed that the Court failed to analyze the 
statute utilizing the proper rules of statutory construction.
90
  The Court used modifiers such as 
“substantial” and “specific” in front of the word “utility,” but those adjectives cannot be found 
anywhere in the statutory text.
91
  The Court’s reading departs rom a verbis legis non est 
recendundum, or “from the words of the law, there must be no departure.”92 
Additionally, critics argued that the Court has confused positive utility, which is the 
section 101 analysis discussed in this article, and relative utility, which is analyzed in the 
specification section of the patent application pursuant to section 112.
93
  Positive utility is 
derived from the plain meaning of the word “useful,” which means capable of being put to use.94  
This definition represents the minimal utility standard set forth by Justice Story.
95
   
By requiring “substantial” and “specific” utility for chemical processes, the Court set a 
murky precedent that is hard to define and enforce uniformly.
96
  Because the Court in Brenner 
failed to give further guidance regarding the new chemical invention utility standard, the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the “CAFC”) further developed the standard via case law.  
Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, the CAFC struggled to make a black and white rule on 
what would be considered “substantial” and “specific” utility.97 
                                                 
90
 Eric P. Mirabel, A Review or Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit: “Practical Utility” Is a Useless Concept, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 811, 813-14 (1987). 
91
 35 U.S.C. § 101; Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535; Mirabel, supra note 90, at 814. 
92
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 124 (5th ed. 1979). 
93
 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112; Mirabel, supra note 90, at 815. 
94
 Id. 
95
 Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37. 
96
 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535; Mirabel, supra note 90, at 814. 
97
 Pierce, supra note 26, at 45-53. 
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 In 1995, the CAFC liberalized the chemical process utility requirement in in re Brana.
98
 
There, both the USPTO examiner and the Board found that an application for a new chemical 
lacked utility.
99
  Both the examiner and the Board, however, were confused whether the patent 
application failed to satisfy the section 101 “substantial” utility threshold or the section 112 
specification requirement.
100
 The applicant presented a chemical compound that he asserted was 
useful for anti-tumor activity.
101
  The applicant claimed his compound was an improvement over 
other compounds that were published in a scientific article.
102
  Additionally, he relied on two 
model tests that demonstrated high efficacy in reducing the effects of lymphocytic leukemia.
103
 
The CAFC overturned the Board’s ruling and held that, based upon the preceding 
evidence, the application satisfied the section 101 utility requirement.
104
 Interestingly, the level 
of “substantial” and “specific” utility the inventor in Brana demonstrated was roughly equivalent 
to the level of utility that Manson disclosed in Brenner.  The CAFC in Brana, however, never 
cited to the Brenner Court once.
105
  This loosening of the utility requirement would nonetheless 
revert to the strict standard that Brenner established in the decade to follow.  
 Prior to 1995, the USPTO was silent on the issue of the utility threshold in chemical 
inventions.
106
  Between 1995 and 2001, the USPTO addressed the utility requirement three 
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 In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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 Id. at 1564. 
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 Id. at 1565. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. (“Since one of the tested compounds, NSC 308847, was found to be highly effective 
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104
 Id. at 1566. 
105
 See generally id.; Ghose, supra note 10, at 1670. 
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 Mary Breen Smith, An End to Gene Patents? The Human Genome Project Versus the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office's 1999 Utility Guidelines, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 747, 766 
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different times issuing Guidelines for Examination of Applications for Compliance with the 
Utility Requirement (the “Guidelines”).107   First, in 1995, amidst a series of criticisms, the 
USPTO effectively relaxed the utility standard for biotechnology inventions.
108
  Essentially, if 
the applicant could assert any use whatsoever, then the patent examiner was to approve the 
application with respect to the utility element.
109
  Additionally, examiners were instructed to 
accept the application’s statements as true, unless they had countervailing evidence. 110  Thus, 
applicants were no longer required to provide substantial evidence linking their process with a 
specific use, as the Court required of Manson in Brenner.
111
  
 In 1999, the USPTO revisited the topic of utility.
112
  Several critics argued that the 
“credible” Guidelines issued in 1995 did not comport with the Brenner holding and the USPTO 
did not have the authority to relax a standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court 
without an act of Congress.
113
  By 2001, the Guidelines were clear that “specific, substantial, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2002) (“Despite decisions that have modified and softened the Brenner rule, until 1995 the 
Patent Board followed Brenner strictly.”). 
107
 Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263, (July 14, 1995) [hereinafter, 1995 
Guidelines]; Utility Examination Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440, (Dec. 21, 1999) [hereinafter, 
1999 Guidelines]; Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092 (Jan. 5, 2001) 
[hereinafter, 2001 Guidelines]. 
108
 1995 Guidelines, supra note 107, at 36,264 (“if the applicant has asserted that the claimed 
invention is useful for any particular purpose (i.e. a ‘specific utility’) and that assertion would be 
considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art, do not impose a rejection based on 
lack of utility.”). 
109
 Id. 
110
 Id. at 26,265 (“Office personnel are reminded that they must treat as true a statement of fact 
made by an applicant in relation to an asserted utility, unless countervailing evidence can be 
provided that shows that one of ordinary skill in the art would have a legitimate basis to doubt 
the credibility of such a statement.”). 
111
 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535. 
112
 1999 Guidelines, supra note 107, at 71,440. 
113
 Id. at 71,441 (“Many comments stated that sufficient patentable utility has not been shown 
when the sole disclosed use of an EST is to identify other nucleic acids whose utility was not 
known, and the function of the corresponding gene is not known….Some comments suggested 
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credible utility” was to be demonstrated before a patent could meet the requirements of section 
101.
114
  Although the USPTO caused the utility standard to fluctuate, by 2001 it was returned to 
the strict Brenner standard. 
 After the 2001 Guidelines were released, the CAFC reviewed the Board’s rejection of 
Dane Fisher’s application to patent certain nucleic acid molecules for lack of utility in in re 
Fisher.
 115
  The CAFC carefully analyzed Fisher’s seven articulated utilities for the patent finding 
he had only demonstrated general utility.
116
  Ignoring the liberalization of the utility requirement 
it had set forth in Brana, the court focused on the “substantial” utility requirement mandated by 
the Court in Brenner.
117
 Additionally, the CAFC gave judicial notice to the 2001 Guidelines.
118
  
Ultimately, the CAFC substantiated the Board’s analysis, denied the application, and returned 
the utility requirement to the standard the Court set forth in Brenner.
119
 
 E. Summary of the Two Utility Standards 
 Thus, since the enactment of the Patent Act of 1790, two distinct utility standards have 
been established through case law.  First, Justice Story’s minimalist standard (the “Story 
Standard”), which applied to all patentable subject matter and found utility in all inventions not 
                                                                                                                                                             
that PTO examination procedures would result in granting patents based on nonspecific and 
nonsubstantial utilities, contrary to established case law.”). 
114
 2001 Guidelines, supra note 107, at 1,094 (“The utility requirement, as explained by the 
courts, only requires that the inventor disclose a practical or real world benefit available from the 
invention, i.e., a specific, substantial and credible utility.”). 
115
 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
116
 Id. at 1370 (“It argues that Fisher failed to meet that standard because Fisher's alleged uses 
are so general as to be meaningless.”). 
117
 Id. at 1369 (citing Brenner, 383 U.S. at 519). 
118
 Id. at 1370 (“The government contends that a patent applicant need disclose only a single 
specific and substantial utility pursuant to Brenner, the very standard articulated in the PTO’s 
‘Utility Examination Guidelines’…and followed here when examining the ‘643 application.”). 
119
 Id. at 1379. 
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pernicious or against public policy.
120
  Second, the standard the Court announced in Brenner (the 
“Brenner Standard”), which applies strictly to patentable chemical inventions and requires 
“substantial” utility that demonstrates a “specific” benefit “exist[ing] in [a] currently available 
form.”121  Part IV of this article analyzes both standards applied to chemical inventions from an 
economic perspective and asserts that the Story Standard is preferable for all patentable subject 
matter. 
IV. Economic Principles Applied to the Patent Utility Standard 
The economic objective of intellectual property law is to provide enough incentive to the 
creators of intellectual property so that they will bear the cost of creation.
122
  Additionally, 
intellectual property rights should not be so exclusive that the public cannot share and use the 
creators’ intellectual property.123  Economists and legal analysts often differ on how to best 
achieve the optimal balance between providing incentives to creators and access to the public. 
From his perspective, an inventor will only invest in the creation of intellectual property 
if he receives what he perceives to be an appropriate return.
124
  The inventor’s ability to collect a 
sufficient return is dependent on his ability to collect, in some form, a portion of the value that 
the public places in the invention.
125
  If the intellectual property legal system in place does not 
permit the inventor to collect enough value from the public for his invention, then the inventor 
will cease to invent.
126
  The most prevalent reason why an inventor would not be able to collect a 
sufficient return for his invention is if one of his competitors were able to replicate his invention 
                                                 
120
 Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37. 
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 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535. 
122
 Besen & Raskind, supra note 2, at 5. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
125
 Id. 
126
 Id. (“If potential innovators are limited in their ability to capture this value, they may not have 
enough value to invest a socially optimal amount in innovative activity.”). 
  18 
at little or no cost.
127
  Similarly, if others are able to expand upon an underlying invention 
without returning value to the original inventor, then the original inventor loses a significant 
amount of incentive to invent.  Thus, an intellectual property legal system is required to give 
some form of rights to inventors in order to provide enough incentive to invent.
128
 
Legislators and regulators, however, must analyze incentives from the public’s 
perspective as well.
129
  If the rights given to an inventor are too exclusive, then the invention 
may not be widely used.
130
  If the invention is not widely used, then society may be in the same 
position it would be if there were a suboptimal reward for innovation, but all innovation was 
widely disseminated.
131
  Both scenarios are economically inefficient and, therefore, hinder 
innovation.  Thus, it is critical for a legal system to find the appropriate balance between inventor 
incentives and public access.  
There are multiple economic theories applicable to intellectual property rights that seek 
this optimal balance between inventor incentives and public access.
132
  The cost-benefit theory 
compares and contrasts the costs and benefits that are produced from either expanding 
intellectual property rights and restricting public access or, alternatively, restricting intellectual 
property rights and expanding public access.
133
  Other economists prefer the average cost theory, 
which proposes that an optimal legal system should provide exactly enough incentive to cover 
the average inventor’s costs.134  
                                                 
127
 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. at 6. 
130
 Id.  
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 Id.  
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 Barnes, supra note 12, at 119-24. 
133
 Id. at 120. 
134
  Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law: Theory and 
Application, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 14 (2005) (explaining extra incentives will not inspire the 
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While both theories have their advantages and disadvantages, the cost-benefit approach is 
slightly more practical in determining the optimal level of intellectual property rights.
135
  First, 
the average cost approach fails to account for the social benefits that are created by new 
intellectual property or the social benefits gained by increased access to intellectual property.
136
  
The magnitude of an inventor’s cost is not the sole consideration that should be taken account in 
the balancing equation; social value is an important factor that needs to be included.
137
  Second, 
the average cost theory creates the market presumption that an inventor’s cost will always be 
covered, which may lead to an inaccurate analysis.
138
  The idea that an inventor’s cost will 
always be covered strays from the conventional wisdom that structures a free-market 
economy.
139
  Finally, the average cost of acquiring a patent is a variable that is highly correlated 
with the patent legal system.
140
  If the legal system changes, then the average cost of acquiring a 
patent will also change.
141
  Nevertheless, both theories are presented below and, when applied to 
the Story Standard and the Brenner Standard, they both reach similar conclusions. 
A. The Cost-Benefit and Net Benefit Approach 
The fundamental question in the cost-benefit analysis is whether granting increased rights 
to the creators of intellectual property outweighs the social benefits that would be lost by 
                                                                                                                                                             
an author or inventor to create more intellectual property); see also F. Scott Kieff, Property 
Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 727 (2001). 
135
 Barnes, supra note 12, at 121.  
136
 Id. (discussing the social value of intellectual property investments compared to the 
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137
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 Id. 
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 John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1077, 1078 (2005) (explaining that if an intellectual property system only granted 
monopolies for a short duration of time, investment in intellectual property would be dissipate 
accordingly). 
141
 Id. 
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restricting public access.
142
  Thus, intellectual property rights should be expanded if the benefit 
from the expansion is greater than the resulting cost to public access. Conversely, intellectual 
property rights should be restricted if the reduced incentives to inventors are outweighed by the 
benefit to public access. 
The net benefit theory uses the fundamental principles of the cost-benefit approach, but 
allows economists studying intellectual property to view the original formula from a slightly 
more practical angle.  The net benefit thoery recognizes that both inventor incentives and public 
access can be viewed as a benefit from one perspective while simultaneously being viewed as a 
cost from another perspective.
143
  An increase in inventor incentives is a benefit to inventors and 
may produce more intellectual property; this, however, will increase the public’s cost of 
accessing the intellectual property.  Vice versa, an increase in public access will allow more 
people to benefit from inventors’ intellectual property, but it may reduce the total amount of 
intellectual property due to a lack of incentives.  Therefore, to simplify the analysis, the net 
benefit rule eliminates perspectives.  When applied to intellectual property, the net benefit rule 
weighs the overall value of an increase in intellectual property rights against the overall value of 
an increase in public access.
144
  Thus, the net benefit principle proposes: 
1. An increase in exclusive rights to intellectual property is justified only 
 when the value of increased creative activity resulting from increased 
 incentives is greater than the value of the benefits lost from reduced 
 access. 
 
                                                 
142
 Barnes, supra note 12, at 120. 
143
 Id. at 121-22 (“A net benefit rule avoids characterizing one option as a cost and the other as a 
benefit, but instead mediates between these extremes and is analytically identical to the cost-
benefit approach.”). 
144
 Id. at 122. 
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2. An increase in access to intellectual property is justified only when the 
 value of the benefits resulting from increased access is greater than the 
 value of decreased creative activity resulting from decreased incentives.
145
 
 
Following these principles, it is important to analyze the incremental effect on all factors 
when considering increasing or decreasing intellectual property rights and public access. 
 B. Applying the Net Benefit Rule to the Patent Law Utility Requirement 
The Story Standard requires a minimal demonstration of usefulness from an inventor.
146
  
Comparing the Story Standard to the more burdensome Brenner Standard,
147
 it is clear that an 
inventor is more likely to meet the utility threshold required for the patent grant under the Story 
Standard.  Applying both standards to potentially patentable chemical inventions, it easier for an 
inventor to simply demonstrate that his invention is not a danger to society rather than proving 
the invention has a “specific” and “substantial” use in its current form.  Consequently, because it 
easier for an inventor to receive patent protection under the Story Standard, a reversion to this 
standard from the Brenner Standard would be viewed as an increase in intellectual property 
protection.  Applying the net benefit rule, this increase in intellectual property rights would only 
be justified if the net benefit of the increased inventor creativity is greater than the net benefit of 
the reduced right of access.   
If the Story Standard governed potentially patentable chemical inventions, the patent 
system would grant the exclusive right to a monopoly over the invention at an earlier stage of the 
inventor’s research.  This would ultimately reduce the cost of obtaining a patent because 
inventors would not have to further invest in discovering a specific use for the chemical 
compound they discovered prior to filing a patent application.  Consequently, more inventors 
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would apply for chemical invention patents, and their applications would be more likely to 
survive the examiner’s scrutiny.  An increase in patents would result in an increase of 
disclosures.   
The increase in patents and disclosures benefits both inventors and society for several 
reasons.  First, an increase in disclosures would result in an increase of information in the public 
domain after the inventor’s patent window lapses.  While the public would not have a right to use 
any of the inventions or the material in their disclosures without the permission of the inventor 
during the patent period, an increase of information in the public domain would lead to quicker 
technological development at a macro level.   
Second, the increase in disclosures would lead to an increase in license agreements 
between scientists.   Under the Story Standard, a scientist may invent a chemical compound and 
patent it without knowing its specific use.  Hypothetically, after the inventor has patented the 
compound, other scientists could enter into a licensing agreement with the inventor to explore 
the potential benefits of the newly patented compound.  These license agreements would 
expedite the process of discovering any beneficial and specific uses of chemical inventions.  In 
addition to spurring innovation and enhancing society, the licenses would also stimulate 
commerce.  The commercial value of a chemical invention may initially be unknown to the 
original inventor, but through these license agreements, other scientists could enlighten the 
original inventor of particular uses he had yet to discover.  
Alternatively, under the Brenner Standard, inventors who have developed a new 
chemical invention, but have not developed a specific use for the invention are not able to apply 
for patent protection.  Consequently, inventors choose not to disclose their inventions until they 
discover a specified use.  This results in two scenarios: (1) the inventor delays disclosure until a 
  23 
specified use is discovered or (2) the inventor abandons his research and keeps it private forever 
because there is no economic incentive to disclose.  Both situations are unfavorable for the 
inventor and society.  In the former scenario, the inventor disadvantages society by delaying the 
release of beneficial information.  In the latter scenario, the inventor disadvantages society by 
never releasing the beneficial information.  
There is one potential drawback to implementing the Story Standard for patenting 
chemical inventions.  There is a concern that too many scientists may apply for chemical patents 
while their inventions are still in their infancy.  As a result, other scientists will be excluded from 
freely conducting research on an increasing amount of chemical compounds and processes.  The 
Story Standard may at times result in scientists cornering off certain chemical markets by 
acquiring patents and then preventing other scientists from further experimentation.  This may 
result in a suboptimal level of scientific growth. 
Utilizing the net benefit rule, however, the Story Standard’s increase is exclusive rights to 
inventors outweighs the benefits lost by reduced public access.  While there is a small potential 
for abuse, the Story Standard, if applied to chemical inventions, would increase disclosure, 
license agreements, technological advancement, and commerce in today’s society.   
C. The Average Cost Theory 
The average cost theory seeks to compensate an inventor at precisely the same level as 
the costs he sunk into creating the invention.
148
  Professor Jeffrey Harrison, viewing the problem 
from the inventor’s perspective, notes that there is no reason to further incentivize an inventor 
                                                 
148
 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1031, 
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that any additional compensation is wasteful). 
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beyond his costs because doing so will only create waste.
149
  Incentivizing the inventor beyond 
his costs will not inspire more creativity or intellectual property; rather, it will restrict public 
access to the intellectual property without inducing more creation.
150
  Thus, if an intellectual 
property legal system rewards an inventor beyond his cost, it is creating an economic burden to 
society.
151
 
Consequently, the average cost theory aims to return the average cost of invention to the 
inventor.
152
  The nexus where intellectual property rights meet average cost is the economically 
optimal point between incentivizing inventors and allowing public access to their inventions.
153
  
By returning an inventor’s average cost to him, the intellectual property system removes the 
competitive advantage a copier may have over the inventor.
154
  This eliminates the economic fear 
inventor’s possess when they file a public disclosure with the patent office. 
D. Applying the Average Cost Theory to the Patent Law Utility Requirement  
As demonstrated above, the average cost of creation is lower under the Story Standard 
than under the Brenner Standard.  This is true because an inventor does not need to invest the 
additional time and money necessary to develop a specific use for his chemical invention; rather, 
the invention would be considered patentable from a utility perspective if the inventor could 
demonstrate that the invention was simply not harmful.  
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A lower average cost of invention would benefit inventors and society in multiple ways.  
First, reducing the average cost of invention would allow more inventors to apply for patents.  
This would result in increased public disclosures.  As stated above, an increase in technological 
disclosures drives an increase in licensing, information in the public domain, and commerce, 
ultimately leading to a more rapid rate of scientific evolution.   
According to the average cost theory, if a legal system were to lower the average cost of 
creation by adopting the Story Standard for chemical inventions, then a proportional reduction in 
inventor incentives should follow to avoid waste.  After carefully evaluating the new average 
cost of invention, Congress should reduce intellectual property rights to proportionally 
compensate for the lowered average cost of invention.
155
  Congress could choose to, inter alia, 
decrease the duration of chemical patents or reduce the exclusive rights of inventors in various 
ways.  This will avoid the economic waste that Professor Mark Lemley details in his analysis of 
overcompensating creators.
156
  Therefore, if the Story Standard were applied to chemical patents, 
the rate of invention would remain a constant, but intellectual property rights would be reduced 
allowing greater public access to inventions.  For the foregoing reasons, the Story Standard is 
economically preferable to the Brenner Standard.  
V. Conclusion 
 Since its inception, American patent law has required inventors to demonstrate their 
invention is “useful” before granting a patent. 157   Throughout American history, the legal 
threshold of utility that inventors have been required to demonstrate for chemical inventions has 
fluctuated between the minimalist Story Standard and the stricter Brenner Standard.  From a 
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legal perspective, the courts have struggled over what constitutes specific and substantial utility, 
and regulators have debated whether the Brenner decision set the utility threshold at a point too 
burdensome for inventors.  Employing economics, this article concludes that the current Brenner 
Standard hinders creation, encumbers commerce, and slows technological innovation.  Both the 
net benefit rule and the average cost theory dictate that the Story Standard is economically 
preferable to the Brenner Standard.  As such, Congress should take the appropriate steps to fully 
investigate the patent utility standard across all subject matter and adopt legislation adjusting the 
standard accordingly.  
 
